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Abstract:  
We study at an individual level the prices that banks pay for liquidity, measured here by 
overnight rates charged for unsecured loans on the e-MID trading platform, which is an 
important and transparent money market for European banks. Using data from both before 
and within crisis sub-periods, we provide evidence that borrower’s and lender’s own liquidity 
status has a significant impact on overnight rates, both before and during the turmoil periods. 
We first review the literature focused on the role of liquidity risk in the recent interbank 
turmoil. We then implement an integrative LSDV estimation to assess the determinants of e-
MID overnight rates. In these regressions, we put together measures of the three types of 
factors that have received theoretical and empirical support, namely, counterparty risk, 
liquidity factors and market imperfections. We find that even when counterparty risk and 
market imperfections are controlled for, banks with higher funding liquidity risk pay an 
interest rate premium. We show that this is probably explained by hoarding and short-
squeezing behavior of liquidity-long banks. These phenomena disappeared when the ECB 
launched its full allotment policy in October 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial turmoil has revealed overlooked fragilities in the wholesale money 
market, when the spreads of short-term interbank loans started to become exceptionally large 
and volatile during summer 2007. According to the expectations theory of the yield curve, 
current and expected short-term interest rates influence all other rates. They consequently 
form the first stage of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. That is why a large 
theoretical and empirical body of literature has developed around the determinants of these 
tensions in interbank markets. Several significant advances have been made that show that 
both solvency and liquidity problems have played a role in the evolution of money market 
rates during this troubled period. However, the contribution of liquidity risk among these 
factors remains controversial. Some rigorous empirical studies that tried to disentangle the 
components of money market spreads over the crisis period obtained disappointing results 
regarding the impact of liquidity risk and liquidity hoarding behaviors (Angelini et al. 2011, 
Afonso et al. 2011a, Afonso et al. 2011b). In the same perspective, some event studies of 
central bank interventions during the turmoil found that the provision of supplementary 
liquidity did not relieve interbank tensions. Their authors consequently concluded that public 
liquidity crowds out private liquidity in a context of elevated counterparty risk and high 
asymmetric information (Taylor and Williams 2009, Brunetti et al. 2011). These empirical 
results are supported by various modeling endeavors that conclude in favor of the explanation 
of the interbank market freeze by solvency or adverse selection problems (see, e.g., Flannery 
and Sorescu 1996, Flannery 1996, Furfine 2001, Freixas and Jorge 2008, Heider et al. 2009).  
This set of results challenges the view that lender of last resort interventions would be 
an efficient resolution mechanism for interbank market crises. They also question the 
emphasis put by central bankers and prudential regulators on banks’ liquidity position and the 
ongoing implementation of the two liquidity ratios proposed in the Basel 3 framework. If 
insolvency and asymmetric information are the roots of all evil, lender of last resort 
interventions are at best relevant to curing market liquidity problems, but they are useless in 
treating liquidity hoarding in the interbank market. The only relevant treatment for the latter 
disease would be to restructure insolvent banks and reduce asymmetric information by 
publishing stress tests or any other type of relevant information on banks’ solvency (Brunetti 
et al. 2011).  
Nevertheless, a number of theoretical and empirical papers now suggest that liquidity 
problems indeed played a role during the interbank market turmoil. On the theoretical side, 
contagious liquidity shocks are convincingly modelled, for example, in Allen & Gale (2000), 
and Allen et al. (2009). Other theoretical models more specifically focused on money markets 
show that hoarding and overpricing of liquidity can be a rational behavior for lenders (e.g., 
Eisenschmidt and Tapking, 2009, Acharya and Skeie, 2011) and for borrowers (e.g., Nyborg 
and Strebulaeev, 2004, Valimaki, 2008). On the empirical side, several papers confirm that 
interbank markets do not always allocate liquidity efficiently. Some recent studies have 
shown that banks fearing to be liquidity-short pay interest rate premiums during the Main 
Refinancing Operations (MRO) of the European Central Bank (ECB), in normal times as well 
as during turmoils (Bindseil et al., 2009, Eisenschmidt et al., 2009, Drehman and Nikolaou, 
2010, Fecht et al. 2011). There is also a series of empirical results showing that both 
aggregate and individual liquidity positions significantly contribute to interbank rates 
dynamic during the crisis (e.g., Michaud and Upper 2008, De Socio 2011, Beirne, 2012, 
Acharya and Merrouche 2013, Soares and Rodriguez 2013). Lastly, several studies show that 
liquidity provision by central banks actually relieved interbank markets during the crisis 
(McAndrews et al. 2008, Christensen et al. 2009, Hesse and Frank 2009). 
In this paper, we add new results to the empirical literature that studies the liquidity 
premium paid by banks on money markets. Most previous cross-sectional studies focused on 
  
 
the primary money market and therefore examined banks behavior during auctions organized 
by central banks for their main refinancing operations. They all argue that the significant 
liquidity premium observed in this primary money market is explained by the two following 
rationales: banks expecting to be liquidity-short would overbid at the repo auctions because 
they fear either being squeezed by liquidity-long banks on the secondary money market or 
because they do not want to experience the stigma effect of borrowing at the marginal lending 
facility. However, there is still a lack of evidence that banks borrowing in the secondary 
money market actually have to pay a liquidity premium because they are squeezed by their 
liquidity-long pairs. We only know of one cross-sectional study on the secondary Sterling 
money market made by Acharya and Merrouche (2013), which found that individual 
unsecured overnight spreads vary significantly with the liquidity held by other banks but not 
with the bank’s own liquidity endowment.  
We obtain different results for the Eurozone because both the own liquidity position of 
borrowers and the liquidity situation of lenders appear to influence significantly the individual 
overnight rates in our estimations. We also differ from the two other studies that exist on the 
interbank Euro Money market because we work at an individual bank level whereas they use 
aggregate EONIA spreads (Beirne, 2012, Soares and Rodriguez 2013). 
We implement an integrative approach to estimate the determinants of e-MID overnight 
interbank rates, in which we try to integrate relevant measures of the three types of factors 
that have received theoretical and empirical support in recent years, namely counterparty risk, 
liquidity balances and market imperfections. e-MID SIM S.p.A. is a multilateral electronic 
platform where nearly 200 Italian and European banks exchange unsecured interbank deposits 
and Overnight Indexed Swaps. It is one of the two multilateral trading devices in the 
European interbank unsecured deposit market and, according to the ECB Financial Integration 
Report, e-MID accounted for 17% of the total turnover of the unsecured segment of the Euro 
market before the crisis. e-MID is the only publicly available source of micro data on 
interbank uncollateralized transactions in the Euro area because the majority of short-term 
interbank transactions are negotiated over the counter. Publicly disseminated EONIA, LIBOR 
and EURIBOR rates are averaged over a limited panel of large banks in a way that does not 
allow cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, e-MID rates are those of actual transactions and 
therefore do not suffer from the potential distortions affecting LIBOR and EURIBOR rates.  
A couple of recent papers use e-MID data to analyze overnight interbank rates, but we 
differ significantly. First, we cover a larger period before and after the onset of the “subprime 
crisis”: our dataset starts on January 2, 2006, and ends on December 31, 2009, whereas most 
studies on e-MID cover 2006 to mid-20081. More importantly, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to obtain evidence of a funding liquidity effect in a cross-sectional 
decomposition of the e-Mid overnight rate. Cassola and al. (2010) Kapar and Iori (2011) and 
Liberati et al. (2012) use similar data but focus on the determinants of market fragmentation 
and market power. Gabrieli et al. (2012) mainly concentrate on connectedness issues. Brunetti 
et al. (2011) implement an event study of the impact of ECB’s intervention news on e-MID 
overnight rates but do not account for banks’ individual levels of liquidity. Michaud and 
Upper (2008) employ e-MID rates as indicators of market liquidity but estimate funding 
liquidity as a residual. More similar to ours is the paper by Angelini et al. (2011) in which 
they explain the spread between e-MID rates and average Eurepo rates by a complete set of 
variables accounting for credit risk, balance sheet liquidity factors and various market 
imperfection measures. However, they study term rates (one week and more) and their 
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 In many papers authors provide studies until the passage to the Fixed Rate Full Allotment (FRFA) MRO 
auctions by the ECB (October 2008). In this paper we extend our study up to the announcement date of new 1-
year FRFA LTROs by the ECB. We consider that at least until that period the interbank market still provides 
relevant information about banks’ funding needs.  
  
 
liquidity variables prove non-significant. On the contrary, we find that all three types of 
factors contribute to the dynamic of e-MID overnight rates over the period, and the impact of 
our measures of borrowers and lenders’ liquidity positions are significant and even more so 
after the start of the crisis.  
In section 2, we review the theoretical and empirical literature related to the role of 
funding liquidity in the recent interbank turmoil. In section 3, we describe our data and 
estimation specificities. In section 4, we comment on results from regression specifications 
that test whether liquidity position matters across different periods before and after the onset 
of the subprime crisis. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Over-pricing of liquidity in money markets: theoretical foundations and 
empirical evidence 
The liquidity crisis that hurt money markets during the subprime crisis can be shortly 
described as a paradoxical situation wherein some lenders preferred to hoard liquidity even if 
some borrowers were ready to pay a substantial premium for that liquidity. Consequently, 
raising cash- on short notice became particularly difficult and costly. To understand such an 
event, it is useful to begin with a reminder of some theoretical definitions of funding liquidity. 
They are helpful to understanding the liquidity preference behaviors that partly explain the 
money-market freeze of 2008; they also help in understanding why it is difficult to build 
relevant liquidity indicators. 
Some authors make a clear distinction between funding liquidity on the liability side, 
which is defined as the ability to borrow in order to settle obligations, and funding liquidity 
on the asset side, which completely depends on market liquidity because it is defined as the 
ability to sell assets in order to settle obligations (Tirole 2010). Other authors consider that 
these two modes of raising cash are the two sides of the same coin (Borio 2000, Strahan 2008, 
Brunnermeier and Pederson 2009). It is true that securitization operations are supported by 
contingent lines of credit, which means that the originator uses both asset and liability 
management to obtain liquidity. However, the conceptual distinction between the liability and 
the asset side of funding liquidity proves useful because the reasons that make liquidity 
available or unavailable on each side of the balance sheet are not the same and do not require 
the same indicators to be detected empirically.  
Regarding funding liquidity on the liability side, the key issues are a) why and when do 
some lenders refuse to offer the quantity of liquidity that they would have offered in normal 
times and b) why are some borrowers ready to pay an excessive price for this liquidity? In 
money markets, potential lenders may hoard liquidity because of a precautionary motive due 
to various reasons: payments uncertainty (Acharya and Merrouche, 2013, Holmström and 
Tirole, 2011), increasing anticipations of rollover risk (Acharia and Skeie 2010), bad news 
regarding inadequately understood financial innovations (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2008, 
Krishnamurthy 2010) or, lastly, elevated asymmetric information making lenders unable to 
differentiate illiquid counterparties from insolvent ones (Flannery 1996, Freixas and Jorge 
2008). Opportunistic conduct may also drive up the price of liquidity. For instance, during 
central banks’ main refinancing operations, banks with high collateral endowments may 
borrow more than they need in order to acquire a market power in the secondary money 
market. Moreover, the way the ECB conducts its MROs, i.e., fixed or variable rate tenders, 
respectively aggravates or alleviates the short-squeezing problem (Nyborg and Strebulaeev, 
2004; Bindseil and Nyborg, 2007). The impact of the first stage liquidity allocation on the 
interbank rates has been empirically evidenced for the Eurozone (Bindseil et al., 2009, 
Eisenschmidt et al., 2009, Fecht et al. 2011). Another strategic behavior consists in refusing to 
  
 
lend in money markets in order to force needy banks to fire-sell their assets at a discount price 
(Acharya et al. 2009). 
On the asset side, funding liquidity depends on whether the securities held will be easily 
tradable. In normal times, it depends on market microstructure characteristics such as 
deepness, resilience and trading costs. In bad times, the main determinant of the liquidity of 
an asset class is whether some agents will be eager to buy when many others are willing to 
sell them. Some authors contend that T-bills do possess this property that allow them to 
deliver cash when it is most needed, others underline that liquidity spirals can make liquidity 
vanish in every market segment because of fire sales and liquidity commonalities across stock 
and bond markets (Chordia et al. 2000). Market liquidity can therefore suddenly dry up on 
very large portions of the financial marketplace. In terms of measurement, it is clear that 
market microstructure variables such as bid-ask spreads and volume turnovers only capture 
the level of market liquidity in normal times. In bad times, the liquid assets are those that 
attract investors during the “flight to quality” movement. The safest T-bills may provide the 
required liquidity but they are a scarce resource and, in very bad times, gold or reserve 
currencies like the Swiss Franc may be considered better stores of value. Moreover, the 
ultimate liquidity is the most universally acceptable debt settlement medium: commercial 
bank money for non-monetary agents; central bank money for commercial banks. 
Consequently, the use of stock ratios such as liquid assets over total assets to capture the asset 
side funding liquidity may prove disappointing when self-fulfilling changes in beliefs modify 
what the market perceives as liquid assets. If assets become periodically illiquid, stock-based 
liquidity ratios are not good indicators of individual liquidity positions in bad times.  
 This suggests that the funding liquidity constraint is better understood if one focuses 
on the flows of cash that can be generated from both the asset and the liability side of the 
balance sheet. Focusing on daily bank payments, one can write this constraint according to the 
following equation:  
(1) AtM CBttinflowstoutflowstB ∇−∇−−=∆  
This equation states that the flow ∆Bt of new liquidity that a bank needs to borrow (or 
lend if ∆Bt is negative) on money markets on day t is equal to the difference of its cash 
outflows and inflows the same day less any variation in its central bank reserves, ∇MtCB, and 
less the flow of cash that it can obtain from selling assets on day t, ∇At. To put it differently, a 
bank can fill the gap between its outflows and inflows by either depleting its stock of assets 
(if liquid enough) or cash reserves at the central bank, or by borrowing on money markets2. 
Funding liquidity risk implies that a bank may be at the same time stock-liquid and 
flow-illiquid: liquid in the sense that its stocks of assets At and central bank deposits MtCB are 
reasonably large, and illiquid in the sense that it suffers from larger than usual outflows on 
day t and cannot sell enough assets because of market illiquidity nor withdraw enough of its 
central bank deposits because of legal reserve requirements constraints. Of course, it is 
possible in such a situation to borrow at the central bank’s standing facilities (the lending 
facility in the Eurozone), but at a penalty rate. Consequently, banks prefer borrowing on the 
overnight money market to avoid this penalty as well as the stigmatization resulting from 
emergency discount window borrowing. 
The presence of funding liquidity risk, theoretically modeled as a consequence of 
insurance against possible short-squeezing (Nyborg and Strebulaeev, 2004) or of banks’ 
increasing risk aversion (Valimaki 2006) has been evidenced by a range of empirical studies 
focusing on the bid rates of the ECB’s variable rate MRO auctions. In a study of the behavior 
of German banks during the weekly MROs of the ECB between June 2000 and December 
                                                 
2
 For a slightly different presentation of this constraint, see Drehman and Nikolaou (2013). 
  
 
2001, Fecht et al. (2011) show that the price individual banks pay for liquidity within MRO 
auctions are higher when liquidity distribution is more uneven across banks. They also find 
that small banks with negative excess reserves bid more aggressively as they are the easiest 
prey to be squeezed because of their limited access to interbank funding. Moreover, according 
to Fecht et al. (2011) when the liquidity imbalances are large, all banks tend to pay more for 
liquidity the shorter their reserve positions. This presence of the funding liquidity risk even in 
normal times is confirmed in our empirical results regarding the secondary money market of 
the Eurozone (section 4 below). Similarly, Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) show that the 
funding liquidity risk premium measured by the gap between bid rates and the expected 
marginal3 rate of the auctions is positive, low and stable in normal times but occasionally goes 
through large spikes during key moments of the subprime crisis before the implementation of 
the new fixed rate-full allotment MROs since October 2008. 
A few studies also evidence a funding liquidity risk premium in interbank markets. 
Acharya and Merrouche (2013) study the Sterling interbank market at both aggregate and 
individual levels. At the aggregate level, they find that the average secured and unsecured 
interest rate spreads (with policy rate) paid before the crisis by large UK settlement banks are 
negatively influenced by the aggregate overnight liquidity buffers held by those banks. 
However, they show that the correlation is inverted during the crisis, which provides evidence 
of liquidity hoarding: in stressed times, the funding cost is so high because of increasing 
market illiquidity, stigmatization of marginal borrowing facilities, etc., that banks prefer 
bearing the opportunity cost of keeping excess reserves and accept release of their liquidity 
only at a price exceeding the cost of alternative funding sources. These authors also show that 
individual unsecured overnight spreads paid by UK settlement banks are negatively correlated 
with the total liquidity held by other banks pre-crisis and positively so during the crisis but 
remain independent of the own individual liquidity endowment during the entire observation 
period. Beirne (2012) and Soares and Rodriguez (2013) study the EONIA spread and find that 
aggregate excess liquidity has a significant negative effect on the spread both before and 
during the turmoil (liquidity effect). Contrary to Acharya and Merrouche 2013, they do not 
provide evidence of an inversion of the correlation between excess liquidity and interbank 
rates during the crisis. This could be because reserve targets are self-determined in the UK 
monetary policy framework whereas there is a compulsory reserve requirement system in the 
Eurozone that may render liquidity hoarding unnecessary in times of crisis. However, by 
using cross-sectional data on the Euro system, we manage to differentiate borrowers’ and 
lenders’ liquidity positions and we find that they have effects of opposite signs on the 
individual rates paid by banks on the unsecured Euro overnight money market. This approach 
has the great advantage of providing separate estimates of the two main components of 
funding liquidity risk: the fear of stigma and liquidity squeeze that lead liquidity-short banks 
to bid more aggressively and propose higher short-term rates on one side; the market-power 
and precautionary motives that conduct liquidity-long banks to require and obtain higher rates 
when they have built up a larger stock of excess reserves. 
3. Data, Variables and Regressions  
3.1. Data  
Our principal data source is the e-MID market, an Italian electronic platform providing 
exploitable micro-data on effective European unsecured interbank transactions. Established in 
1990, e-MID was initially limited to coordinating domestic uncollateralized interbank trades 
                                                 
3
 Marginal MRO rate is the lowest, stop-out rate of the auction. Whereas the bids above marginal rate that are 
fully allotted, bids allotted at the marginal rate are usually pro-rata rationed according to the ECB benchmark 
liquidity provision. For a complete description of the ECB’s refinancing procedures, see e.g. Bindseil (2004) or 
Valimaki (2008). 
  
 
made in local currency only. Nevertheless, since the EURO creation, its role has been largely 
expanded to host other European and foreign participants and to insure transactions in four 
different currencies: EURO, USD, GBP and PLN (Polish Zloty). We possess data on the 
EURO-quotes executed via e-MID between January 2, 2006 and December 31, 2009. 
However, we stop the econometric analysis when the ECB launched its program of 1-year 
fixed rate full allotment “Longer-Term Refinancing Operation” (LTRO), on May 7, 2009. 
These operations considerably decreased the activity of the overall European interbank (i-b) 
market during a rather long period. We define the pre-crisis period as the time span between 
January 2, 2006 and August 9, 2007. Within the crisis period, we consider three sub periods: 
the turmoil period before the failure of Lehman Brothers (August 9, 2007, to September 14, 
2008); the turmoil period including the failure of Lehman Brothers (August 9, 2007, to 
October 7, 2008); and the FRFA-MROs period going from October 8, 2008, to May 7, 2009. 
We differentiate this last sub-period because we expect that all types of liquidity position 
effects should be wiped out when ECB’s MROs switched to a Fixed Rate Full Allotment 
(FRFA) procedure.  
e-MID is a screen-based order-driven market on which participant banks post 
transparent, bid and ask, market orders when they need, respectively, to sell or to buy 
uncollateralized liquidity at different maturities (both prices and quantities are posted). 
Maturities for e-MID interbank loans vary from overnight (O/N) to 1 year. In this paper, we 
use exclusively overnight loans that represent 91% of ask and 82% of bid side maturities. 
Banks prefer short-term lending because they lend unsecured on e-MID and because 
overnight trading is one of the most convenient tools for the end of day reserve averaging 
during the maintenance period. Bid and ask order executions on e-MID are neither price- nor 
time-priority based. Once orders have been posted, the aggressor hits the order that suits him 
the best. Counterparties can always refuse the hit, no matter on which market side they are 
(bid or ask). Refusals are very common and may occur for different reasons: the borrower has 
no credit line with the lender; the credit line has already been used entirely (generally, the 
credit limit is unknown to the borrower and is chosen daily by the lender); or there is no 
agreement on the details of the order sent. The last reason indicates the particularity of e-MID 
quotes because they can be re-negotiated. According to our e-MID correspondent, the 
aggressor may change the interest rate or the quantity of the quote it hits. Finally, very few 
transactions are concluded at the quoter’s initial terms (approximately 10% of transactions).  
In our dataset, buyer initiated contracts account for 80% of overnight transactions. We 
choose to pool rates of buy- and sell-sides. Hence, we include a control variable representing 
the weight of buyer-initiated loans (bid side).  
 
e-MID as a part of the European unsecured money market 
European banks have the opportunity to sign unsecured credits either by direct bilateral 
agreements (OTC), or by intermediation of voice and electronic brokers. In Europe, organized 
market trading of interbank unsecured loans is exclusively carried out on the Italian e-MID 
electronic platform and on the Spanish MID platform, which is much smaller. The ECB and 
some Ministries of Finance supervise e-MID. At least until the beginning of 2009, volumes 
traded electronically by e-MID represented approximately 20% of the overall European 
unsecured market (see ECB’s Euro Money Markets Studies of February 2009 and December 
2010).  
To illustrate the importance of the e-MID dataset in terms of traded volumes on a 
European scale, we present e-MID daily overnight turnover as a share of EONIA4 trades in 
                                                 
4
 Eonia stands for Euro OverNight Index Average, which is the effective overnight reference rate for the euro. It 
is computed as a volume-weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken in the 
  
 
Figure 1. As one can observe, in the period going up to the beginning of August 2007 that we 
define as the pre-crisis sub-period, e-MID overnight trades accounted on average for 53% of 
EONIA volumes. Within the pre-crisis phase we often find dates with e-MID volumes almost 
as important as EONIA ones (sometimes even exceeding). Starting from August 2007, the e-
MID average share unsurprisingly dropped to 35% of EONIA turnover. e-MID experienced 
other activity drops after Lehman Brothers’ collapse. A decrease can be observed after the 
ECB switches from variable rate to fixed rate full allotment auctions for its MROs (October 
15, 2008), and another one can be observed after the implementation of the first 1-year FRFA 
LTRO on June 25, 20095 (announced on May 7, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 1: The share of daily e-MID turnover in EONIA  
 
Sources: Authors’ computations from e-MID dataset, the ECB’s official website. 
Representation: e-MID daily overnight turnover as a share of EONIA trades. The first vertical line represents 
financial crisis breakpoint (August 9, 2007). The second one corresponds to Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008). 
The third one indicates the implementation of the first full allotment MRO on October 15, 2008. The fourth one 
represents the first full allotment LTRO at 1 year maturity (June 25, 2009). During that long-term operation 442.42 
billion Euros have been allotted to 1121 banks at a fixed rate of 1% 
 
The FRFA-MROs era was also characterized by growing segmentation of the European 
interbank market (see ECB’s survey “Financial Integration in Europe” of April 2010). Some 
authors (Freixas and Holthausen 2004, Cassola et al. 2010) describe the phenomenon as a 
result of increasing informational asymmetries between local and foreign financial institutions 
due to the crisis. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that e-MID’s share of international transactions by 
reserve maintenance period dropped sharply starting from the last months of 2008. Despite 
the ECB’s multiple interventions in the form of unlimited liquidity supply, the European 
interbank market segmentation continued deepening during 2009 in terms of volumes6. In our 
                                                                                                                                                   
interbank market, initiated within the euro area by the contributing banks, known as EONIA Panel. EONIA 
contributors are the banks with the highest volumes of business in the euro money markets. Today’s Eonia Panel 
consists of 39 banks, but they were about 44 during the period covered by our sample. EONIA rate is calculated 
by the ECB and published by Reuters every day before 7:00 p.m. Ecuador Time. 
5 The ECB announced a program of three 1-year FRFA LTROs on May 7, 2009. During the first 1-year FRFA 
MRO the ECB allotted about 442.24 billion Euros to 1,121 bidding counterparties at 1% fixed rate.  
6
 According to the ECB’s survey “Financial Integration in Europe” of April 2010, the three 1-year unlimited 
LRTOs of 2009 had quite stabilizing effects on the cross-border dispersion of interbank European rates. 
However, the situation worsened in terms of volumes traded between European countries. The survey reports 
decreasing shares of non domestic interbank deposits in 2009 compared to 2008.  
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overnight sample, the share of non-domestic trades reached its minimum (below 10%) during 
the 3rd quarter of 2009 (after the first 1 year LTRO)7. Although the emerging market 
segmentation was henceforth an evident threat for the European i-b market, e-MID remains 
representative for the European money market at least during the first two quarters of 2009 
because the share of transactions with at least one non-Italian partner still represented 
approximately 38% of total overnight turnover8. Arciero et al. (2013) consider that the e-MID 
is representative for the total European i-b market at least until the beginning of the Italian 
sovereign debt crisis (August 2011). 
 
Figure 2: The share of Non-Italian turnover in e-MID per RMP  
 
Sources: Authors computations using the e-MID dataset and the ECB’s official website 
Representation: e-MID’s share of non-Italian transactions by reserve maintenance periods. The first vertical line 
represents the financial crisis breakpoint (August 9, 2007). The second one corresponds to Lehman’s failure 
(September 15, 2008). The third one indicates the announcement date of the full allotment fixed rate MROs allotted 
on October 15, 2008 (October 8, 2008). The fourth one represents the announcement date of the fixed rate full 
allotment LTROs of 1-year maturity (May 7, 2009). The first biggest FRFA 1-year LTRO took place on June, 2014 
2009. During that long-term operation 442.42 billion Euros have been allotted to 1,121 banks at a fixed rate of 1%.  
 
In Figure 3, we present the dynamics of both the daily volume-weighted average e-MID 
overnight rate and the EONIA rate among other key rates for the ECB’s monetary policy 
implementation. First, we want to invite readers’ attention to the similitude of e-MID and 
EONIA rates both before and within crisis periods. This fact implies that within the whole 
period under study the composition of banks trading on e-MID remained quite representative 
for overall unsecured European interbank market (if we suppose that EONIA survey 
participants represent Europe). Moreover, Arciero (2010) finds that both before and during 
the turmoil periods the e-MID rates are quite identical to the OTC rates the author has 
extracted from the payment system data via Furfine’s (1999) algorithm. Second, in Figure 3 
one can observe how e-MID (and EONIA) rates react to the changes in ECB’s target rates 
                                                 
7 This period coincides with the beginning of the sovereign crisis in Europe. Important co-moments in European 
state- and bank- debt quality indexes are observed. See, CGFS Paper No 43 “The impact of sovereign credit risk 
on bank funding conditions” BIS July 2011 for details.  
8
 Intragroup activity is not detectable in our dataset. We asked our e-MID correspondent whether intra-group 
activity was important on e-MID. He answered that this activity was very strong in the past (before the period we 
study), due to the high fragmentation of the Italian banking industry. However, he also told us that this is no 
longer a real concern for the period we study (2006-2009) as the consolidation of the industry and the emphasis 
on operational efficiency (which has led to the concentration of treasury activities) have made the intra-group 
trading nearly absent nowadays on e-MID. We could not verify whether this affirmation is true or not however. 
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(min bid rate if variable rate auctions, and fixed policy rate otherwise), standing facility 
corridor and to the non-conventional measures the ECB has made use of when concerned by 
financial stability and monetary policy questions during the crisis. The position of unsecured 
overnight rates in the standing facility corridor and with respect to the ECB’s target rate 
(EONIA spread) reflects, respectively, the demand for interbank overnight funds (the 
tightness of overall liquidity conditions) and the ability of the ECB to steer o/n rates to its 
target. Starting from the FRFA MRO framework the e-MID (and EONIA) rates dropped 
below the policy rate and became closer to the corridor floor suggesting that European banks 
over-satisfied their liquidity needs via unlimited MRO auctions and the interbank market was 
therefore a closer substitute of not holding excess reserves rather than of using the borrowing 
facility of the ECB. This phenomenon became even more persistent after the 1-year FRFA 
MROs in June 2009, where the aggregate excess reserves have reached to unprecedentedly 
high levels. 
 
Figure 3: EONIA, e-MID and other key-rates of the ECB’s monetary policy implementation  
 
Sources:  E-MID dataset and ECB’s official website 
The first vertical red line represents the financial crisis breakpoint (August 9, 2007). The second one corresponds 
to Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008). The third one indicates date of the first full allotment fixed rate MROs 
on October 15, 2008 and the enlargement the list of eligible collaterals for the MRO auctions of the ECB. The 
fourth one represents the allotment date of the first fixed rate full allotment LTRO of 1 year maturity on June 25, 
2009 (announced on May 7, 2009). 
 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. The dependent variable 
In this paper, we analyze the cross-sectional heterogeneity of European overnight 
interbank rates using e-MID data. We aim to explain how far different symptoms of market 
imperfection, such as individual liquidity endowments, bank size, liquidity networks, and 
market segmentation influence i-b overnight prices before and within financial crisis. We 
define our dependent variable wRateij,t(n) as the volume-weighted average rate paid by the 
borrower i to the lender j on day t of the MRO week n. This average overnight rate includes 
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rates from both lender-initiated and borrower-initiated transactions: if there is any 
heterogeneity between bid and ask prices, this will be accounted for by a control variable 
described below. 
The total number of banks transacting at least once on e-MID between January 2, 2006 
and December 31, 2009 is 201. We differentiate borrowers’ and lenders’ panels. A bank is 
present in the former panel if it has been borrower on e-MID at least once over 2006-2009. 
We define similarly lenders’ panel. Among our 201 banks, 178 are present in both lenders’ 
and borrowers’ panels, 18 are lenders only, and 5 are borrowers only. There is a large 
overlapping between these two panels but this is due to the fact that a bank can be present in 
the borrowers sample even if it borrowed only one time. The same is true for lenders. We 
demonstrate below that globally, on e-MID net lenders tend to stay lenders and net borrowers 
tend to stay borrowers. 
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
The Net Interbank Liquidity Position 
As already explained above, the overnight interbank market is banks’ preferred funding 
source to adjust their end-of-day reserve holdings. In the Eurozone, the legal requirement is to 
maintain a bank’s balance sheet based amount of average reserves over a period called the 
Reserve Maintenance Period (RMP). Following the chronology defined in the reserve 
management literature (see, e.g., Poole (1968)), we suppose that banks first try to obtain the 
needed liquidity on the weekly MRO auctions and then borrow (lend) deficit (surplus) on 
interbank markets after the within-day individual liquidity shocks occurred. In the Eurozone, 
a bank has the possibility to manage its reserve holdings between two MRO auctions either 
via the interbank market or by using the ECB’s standing facilities available at penalty rates9. 
Thus, the net interbank borrowing (or lending) level within this specific time span can be a 
good proxy to measure bank’s reserve position and its dependence on the interbank market10.  
To construct our liquidity position variables, we use the information on RMP periods, 
MRO allotment dates and MRO settlement dates provided on the ECB’s website. A given net 
interbank liquidity position does not provide the same bargaining power to a bank when the 
aggregate level of excess (deficit) reserves is high, as when it is low. That is why we chose to 
use the share of bank’s net interbank liquidity position, rather than the pure i-b liquidity to 
explain interest rates. We compute the net interbank borrowing amount (lending, if negative) 
of each bank for every MRO week. The  MRO week is the period starting at the settlement 
date of the  MRO auction and ending at the allotment date of the ( + 1) MRO 
auction11. For the sample we study, we have 176 MRO weeks. We define the variable 	
, 
as the ratio of the net interbank borrowing (lending if < 0) of borrowing bank i during the 
MRO week n over the total volume borrowed (lent) within this week.  
 
	
, = (, − 
,)  ⁄  
 
                                                 
9
 Note that a bank borrowing at the marginal lending facility is also subjected to the opportunity cost of the 
collateral and the additional stress-time cost of being stigmatized by its pairs.  
10
 As mentioned and demonstrated by Brauning and Fecht 2012, the probability that banks borrow or lend i-b is 
mainly driven by their reserve holdings within the RMP. These authors show that banks having negative 
deviations from the required reserves have high probably to be borrowers on the i-b market, and those with 
positive excess reserves have higher probability to be lenders. 
11
 A MRO week never overlaps two different Reserve Maintenance Periods, since every RMP starts on its first 
MRO auction’s settlement date (on Wednesdays) and ends on the first MRO auction’s allotment date of the next 
RMP (on Tuesdays). 
  
 
We also compute  	
, for each lender j because we want to assess whether lenders 
with excess liquidity charge a liquidity premium because they hoard liquidity for 
precautionary reasons or make use of their market power. We regress bilateral overnight rates 
of trading days t(n) belonging to MRO weeks n (wRateij,t(n)) on the banks liquidity positions 
of the lagged MRO week (NILPj,n-1 and NILPi,n-1). 
It may well be the case that banks borrow and lend similar amounts within MRO weeks 
because their liquidity shocks show no persistence. In that case, it would be difficult to argue 
that our NILP variables measure a funding liquidity risk because banks would simply use e-
MID to reshuffle their non-persistent liquidity imbalances. To check this, we first compute the 
ratios (borri,n-lendi,n)/borri,n if borri,n>lendi,n and (borri,n-lendi,n)/lendi,n if borri,n<lendi,n, both 
for lenders and borrowers. We call them LIQURATIOi,n and LIQURATIOj,n. The distribution 
of these ratios across all banks and MRO weeks is displayed in Figures 4 and 5 below. The 
ratios converge to zero when individual borrowers (lenders) borrowed and lent almost the 
same amounts in a given week and they are near one or minus one when the amount borrowed 
(lent) is much higher than the amount lent (borrowed). 
 
Figure 4: Weekly LIQURATIOj,n computed for lenders 
 
 
Figure 5: weekly LIQURATIOi,n computed for borrowers 
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On e-MID clearly, banks do not borrow or lend in a balanced way within weeks. On the 
contrary, they tend to have well established liquidity statuses within each MRO week. This 
suggests that they really use this market for liquidity funding rather than reshuffling of non-
persistent liquidity imbalances. 
However, it may well be the case that banks are not consistently net borrowers or net 
lenders across MRO weeks because their liquidity shocks show no persistence across weeks. 
In that case, they would be net borrowers in one week and net lenders the next week. To 
check this, we compute the fraction of banks that switch liquidity status from one week to 
another and display the resulting transition matrixes in Tables 1 and 2 below. 
 
Table 1: Borrower's liquidity status transition matrix 
 
For banks belonging to the borrowers’ panel, the probability to stay net borrower in 
week n when they were net borrowers in week n-1 or n-2 is 82,62%. 
 
Table 2: Lenders' liquidity transition matrix 
 
For banks belonging to the lenders’ panel, the probability to stay net lender in week n 
when they were net lenders in week n-1 or n-2 is 88,31%. 
We thus conclude from figures 4 & 5 and tables 1 & 2 that, on e-MID, liquidity status 
(or net interbank positions) are persistent both within and across weeks. 
 
If there are some dealer banks on e-MID, they should trade frequently on the two sides 
of the market and, possibly, they should also tend to borrow and lend similar amounts on 
average. Note that Figures 4 and 5 already show that, on weekly basis, there are very few 
banks/weeks that display a near zero LIQURATIO (around 1% of observations in borrowers 
and lenders samples). However, dealer banks may balance their trades on the two sides of the 
market across weeks rather than within weeks. To check this, we average the LIQURATIOs 
computed above for each bank over the entire period (2006-2009). The distribution of the 
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
     Total      15,337     10,938      26,275 
                                             
                 12.39      82.62       41.63 
         1       1,901      9,037      10,938 
                                             
                 87.61      17.38       58.37 
         0      13,436      1,901      15,337 
                                             
  NetBuyer           0          1       Total
               NetBuyer_Previous
                100.00     100.00      100.00 
     Total      10,818     16,290      27,108 
                                             
                 17.63      88.31       60.10 
         1       1,907     14,386      16,293 
                                             
                 82.37      11.69       39.90 
         0       8,911      1,904      10,815 
                                             
 NetSeller           0          1       Total
              NetSeller_Previous
  
 
average absolute values of those ratios for all participating banks is displayed in Figure 6 
below. 
 
Figure 6 : Averaged absolute values of LIQURATIOs for all banks 
 
 
Very few banks have the average ratio near zero. It is thus impossible to define dealer 
banks as those trading similar volumes on the two sides of the market. As a consequence, to 
identify dealer banks, we first compute the number of days each bank acted as both lender and 
borrower. We then divide this figure by the number of days the bank has been active on e-
MID. We consider that the borrower or the lender bank is a “dealer” if it traded on the two 
sides of the market the same day in more than 30% of its overall trading days, and we create 
the dummies dealerborr and dealerlend accordingly. According to this definition, we identify 16 
“dealers” which are all Italian banks except one Greek bank12. The 30% threshold represents 
the 90th percentile of the variable for the panel of participating banks.  
 
Banks’ size proxy 
Because bank size is empirically proven to influence banks’ funding ability, we 
construct size variables following Gabrieli (2012) who also uses e-MID data with encoded 
identities that do not allow identification of participating banks. Based on their overall pre-
crisis turnovers we classify the whole sample of lenders and borrowers in four size groups: 
Major, Large, Medium and Small banks. Major borrowers or lenders are defined by a pre-
crisis turnover exceeding the 90th percentile of the distribution. Large banks are those having a 
turnover level between the 75th and the 90th percentiles. We consider that Medium sized banks 
are those having their turnover level around the median, between the 25th and the 75th 
percentiles. Finally, banks classified as Small have a pre-crisis trading volume below the 25th 
percentile. We generate, accordingly, four categorical size dummies both for the overall panel 
of banks:  !""(#$%), 
 !""(#$%),&' !""(#$%)  ('))  !""(#$%).  
Table A below presents the number of borrowers and lenders per size group and per 
market segment (domestic (Italians) vs foreign). In line with other studies that observe 
effective bank size on e-MID markets, our table reports that in both lenders’ and borrowers’ 
panels approximately 62% of Major and Large banks are non-Italian banks. The share of 
Italian banks is approximately 70% among Medium and Small banks. It is not surprising 
because non-Italian banks trading on e-MID are large international banks that often act as 
                                                 
12
 We think that the need of intermediary banks on e-MID might be motivated either by the willingness of 
lenders to share the credit risk or by settlement reasons. We know that some banks trading on e-MID do not have 
direct access to the TARGET payment system that is used to settle all interbank European trades. 
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intermediaries for their own domestic markets. Given that our pre-crisis activity criterion does 
not allow any size identification for banks entering e-MID after August 9, 2007, we report in 
parenthesis uniquely the number of banks which have disappeared from the borrower’s and 
lender’s panel after that date. We observe that only approximately 4% (6%) of Major-Large 
and 10% (7%) of Medium-Small borrowers (lenders) left the market during the crisis.  
 
Table A: Number of banks by sizes and country 
 
Domestic  Foreign Total  
Borrowers  
Major 7 (0) 12 (0) 19 (0) 
Large  11 (2) 17 (0) 28 (2) 
Medium  60 (4) 28 (4) 88(8) 
Small  29 (2) 7 (3) 36 (5) 
Total 107(8) 64(7)  171 (15) 
Lenders  
Major  7 (1)  12 (0) 19 (1) 
Large 11(2) 17 (0) 28 (2) 
Medium  63 (4) 29 (0) 92(4) 
Small  30 (4) 15 (2) 45(6) 
Total 111(11) 73(2) 184(13) 
In parenthesis: number of banks of the category that left e-Mid during the crisis. Domestic banks are 
Italian banks. “Foreign” banks are all the non-Italian ones. 
 
 
In Figure 7, we display the evolution of average turnovers by size groups. We observe that 
turnovers of Major and Large banks converge progressively toward the trading volumes of 
Medium and Small banks starting from August 2007 (20th RMP), but have still remained 
above the Medium & Smalls’ turnover (borrowing+lending) until the 40th RMP, which 
corresponds to the announcement period of the FRFA 1-year LTROs. The brutal activity drop 
of important banks after this date might be related both to the overall i-b activity drop after 
the ECB’s interventions and to the transparence of the e-MID platform.   
 
  
 
Figure 7 : Average RMP turnover per size group in billions  
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using the e-MID dataset, the ECB’s official website 
Representation: Average RMP turnover for each size-group. The first vertical line represents financial crisis 
breakpoint (August 9, 2007). The second one corresponds to Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008). The third one 
indicates the implementation of the first full allotment MRO on October 15, 2008. The fourth one represents the 
first full allotment LTRO at 1-year maturity (June 25, 2009). 
 
Market segmentation and liquidity networks 
Cassola et al. (2010) attribute the important decline in post-crisis i-b trading to the 
emergence of higher cross-border informational asymmetries. Accordingly, we control for 
market segmentation frictions by generating two binary variables  	* ,   	*,,  
identifying inter- and intra-country transactions, respectively. We observe that 87% of total 
observations are intra-country, and 93% of intra-country transactions are intra-Italian. The 
share of inter-country transactions with at least one Italian partner (borrower or lender) 
represents 53% of total cross-border observations. 
However, a factor that could mitigate the impact of these increasing informational 
asymmetries on i-b rates is the emergence of so-called liquidity networks. Relationship 
lending between banks trading on i-b markets is the topic of several recent empirical studies 
(Cocco et al. 2009, Brauning & Fecht 2013, Affinito 2012). It is expected to become even 
more vital during the crisis period. We measure the impact of these so-called “liquidity 
networks” by computing two relationship variables first introduced by Cocco et al. 2009 and 
commonly used in several other empirical studies on the topic (see. e.g., Brauning & Fecht 
2013, Affinito 2012,Craig & Fecht2013, etc.): Borrower’s and lender’s preference indexes, 
	 and 
	.  
They are defined as:  
 
	36 = -) ,(./0;) -) ,(./0;)⁄  
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The borrower preference index 	36  is the fraction of i’s loans borrowed from j 
during a rolling window of 36 days13 over the total interbank e-MID liabilities of borrower i 
throughout the same period. The lender preference index 
	36  measures the weight of 
loans from j to i in total interbank e-MID assets of lender j during the 36 days preceding the 
day t. 
Controlling for borrower’s reputation  
As mentioned in section 3.1, we choose to pool the bid and ask sides of the market. 
Therefore, to control for possible differences in rates between bid and ask orders, we add to 
the right hand side of our regressions the variable: 
2ℎ* ,() = -) ,() -) ,() ⁄  
representing the weight of buyer-initiated14 loans transacted between lender j and 
borrower i during the day t(n) of the MRO week n. Gabrieli (2012) uses this variable to 
capture the reputation of the borrower. Others, like Schwarz (2009) who uses e-MID data, 
argue that banks that prefer hitting a sell order rather than submitting a buy order are those 
that would hardly find counterparties if they had first shown their identities.   
Table B below presents summary statistics of the main variables used in our 
regressions.   
3.3. Econometric approach and methodological issues 
We aim to understand how the determinants that have been pointed theoretically and 
empirically as sources of i-b market frictions affect the funding risk of banks before and 
within the crisis. In particular, we seek to assess whether borrowers that are liquidity ‘short’ 
are penalized by their liquidity ‘long’ pairs who might exert their supply-side market power. 
It can be a strategic behavior to charge higher rates when one is liquidity-long. According to 
Acharya and Merrouche (2013), such behavior can also be understood as a form of 
precautionary liquidity hoarding (see section 2 above). 
For that purpose, we regress wRateij,t(n), the individual overnight interest rates paid by 
borrowers i to lenders j on trading days t(n) belonging to the MRO week n, on a set of bank- 
and pair-specific variables. We focus especially on the net borrowing position of borrowing 
and lending banks during the ( − 1) MRO week (NILPi,n-1 and NILPj,n-1), which proxy 
their reserve situation in the previous MRO week. We drop from our sample all interest rates 
that are out of the ECB’s rate corridor because they represent very particular transactions with 
borrowers that are probably short of collateral and hence cannot borrow at the ECB’s 
marginal facility (3,262 transactions dropped over an initial sample of 339,005 
transactions/rates). We split our sample into before and within crisis periods and run separate 
regressions for each of them. Because we suspect that sensitivity to funding liquidity risk 
might become stronger during the crisis and subsequently disappear when the ECB launches 
its FRFA MROs, we distinguish three sub-periods within the crisis sub-sample: the turmoil 
period with and without Lehman and the FRFA MROs era, starting on October 8, 2008 and 
ending on May 7, 2009 (The announcement date for the 1-year FRFA LTROs). We consider 
that after the first 1-year FRFA allotment the CB funding prevails over interbank funding, and 
by consequence the individual liquidity positions are no more relevant. All banks have access 
to unlimited liquidity at the same price. In the Euro system, the thing that could discriminate 
banks to access liquidity within this period is the stock and the quality of their collateral they 
need to obtain the ECB funding15.  
                                                 
13
 36 days is the maximum number of operational days that a RMP contains in our sample. This ensures capture 
of the relationships that have been between-banks at least during 1 RMP.  
14
 The quoter is the buyer and the aggressor is the seller. 
15
 Note that concerned by this problem, the ECB has enlarged the list of eligible collaterals for its MRO auctions 
  
 
Table B: Definition and summary statistics of main variables  
Variables Definition  Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
wRatei,j,t(n) Volume Weighted Average Interest Rates at which i 
borrows from j during the date t within the nth MRO 
week. The variable is expressed in bps  
294717 305.28 119.28 25  500 
BPI36 Borrower Preference Index=Borrower i’s borrowed 
amount from j over i’s total borrowings during the 36 
days preceding the date t. The variable is expressed in 
percents 
293075 5.52 11.11 0 100 
LPI36 Lender Preference Index= Lender j’s lended amount to 
i over j’s total lendings during the 36 days preceding the 
date t. The variable is expressed in percents 
293544 8.67 13.63 0 100 
NILPi,n-1 Net Interbank Liquidity Position i, n-1 = the ratio of the 
net interbank borrowing (lending if <0) position of 
borrower i during the lagged (n-1)th MRO week over the 
total borrowings (or lendings) within the same period.  
The variable is expressed in percents 
291493 2.17 3.41 -31.3 35.57 
NILPj,n-1 Net Interbank Liquidity Position i, n = the ratio of the 
net interbank lending (borrowing if >0) position of 
lender j during the  lagged (n-1)th MRO week over the 
market total lendings (or borrowings) within the same 
period. The variable is expressed in percents 
290425 -1.17 2.18 -35.22 30.07 
BidWeighti,j,t(n) Bid Order Weight = the volume share of buyer initiated 
loans transacted between the lender j and the borrower i 
during the day t.  The variable is expressed in percents 
294717 75.81 42.82 0 100 
Intrai,j Intra-National transaction: Dummy= 1 if lender j and 
borrower i have the same nationality and =0 otherwise  
294717 .87 .34 0 1 
Interi,j  Inter-National transaction: Dummy= 1 if the 
transaction  is cross-border and =0 otherwise 
294717 .13 .34 0 1 
  
 
The interest rate paid by i to j on day t contains an average daily component that is 
driven by the ECB’s monetary policy16, market expectations and unobserved daily news that 
may affect interest rates. In this paper, instead of using spreads, we include on the right hand 
side of every regression daily dummies that will account for daily aggregate liquidity 
conditions. We thus control for whatever event could affect average daily rates such as 
calendar effects or ECB interventions. However, because our bank identities are encoded, we 
have no possibility to observe bank specific variables such as capital ratios, ratings, liquid 
asset ratios, collaterals or any other determinant of borrower’s creditworthiness. 
Consequently, we include in all regressions a borrower specific dummy to capture its credit 
quality. One has to underline that even if we are observing unsecured loans, we study the 
overnight part of the interbank, which implies that the impact of solvency indicators is 
certainly less important than in cases of long term unsecured loans (Angelini et al. (2011)).  
In panel form data, the possible presence of within, between or both correlations of 
standard errors should be considered. As shown by Petersen (2009), capturing the permanent 
firm effects by adding firm dummies will not be sufficient to obtain unbiased White standard 
errors in the presence of temporary firm effects. Temporary firm effects imply that within-
firm correlation of errors changes (dies) over time. The data analyzed in this paper contain 
long and troubled time periods, which is a good reason to suspect the presence of temporary 
firm effects. We ran several regressions and compared heteroskedasticity-robust standard-
errors (without clustering) with standard-errors clustered separately at borrower and lender 
levels. We finally choose to report results with standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
borrower level, as they appeared to be more conservative (higher) than White SEs and the 
ones adjusted for lender level clustering. Following Cameron et al. (2006) and 
Petersen (2009), we also tested standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering at borrower-
time and lender-time levels, but they did not provide different results and thus we decided not 
to display them in the paper. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at time level are nearly 
equal to the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (not adjusted for clustering), which 
means that time effects are permanent and have been correctly controlled for by the day 
dummies.  
Regarding possible endogeneity issues, we can first be reassured by the fact that the 
data collection process in e-MID is automated in a way that precludes measurement error, and 
also by the fact that our LSDV estimation method introduces fixed effects in a way that 
should prevent unobserved heterogeneity from creating endogeneity problems. The more 
probable sources of endogeneity remaining are therefore selection and simultaneity. 
Regarding selection, there are two problems. The first one is that some banks leave and others 
enter e-MID after the onset of the crisis and some banks trade more infrequently than the 
others and may create artificial interest rate heterogeneity. This could bias our results 
regarding the liquidity premium if rare or new traders are more sensitive to the funding 
liquidity risk. In section 4, we provide a two-in-one solution for both outlier and panel 
unbalancedness problems by running all regressions on a sample of banks that actively 
participate (lend or borrow) in all the four sub-periods observed. The second selection issue 
may come from the fact that e-MID is a sub-segment of the European money market that may 
attract specific banks for which our liquidity and counterparty risk variables are significant 
whereas this would not necessarily be the case if we had a more representative sample. When 
interpreting the results, we will have to bear in mind that they are representative of only the 
banks that trade on e-MID.  
                                                 
16
 More precisely, it is driven by the target rate, marginal lending and borrowing facilities, errors in estimating 
benchmark allotment level, front loading strategies and many other crisis-related modifications in the aggregate 
liquidity supply procedures. 
  
 
Finally, one could also suspect a reverse causation between our main independent 
variables (NILPi,n-1 and NILPj,n-1, the net interbank liquidity positions of borrower i and 
lender j in week n-1) and the dependent variable wRatei,j,t(n) (the average interest rate paid by 
borrower i on day t of week n): if future individual rates were correctly predicted, banks could 
borrow more liquidity in week n-1 because they anticipate higher rates in week n, and this 
could produce the positive correlation between NILP and wRatei,j,t(n). However, in that case, 
banks would be net borrowers in the week before the anticipated rate increase and they would 
become net lenders during the week wherein they are higher. We showed in section 3.2.2 
above that banks trading on e-MID during our observation period do not switch 
systematically from net borrowers to net lenders in this way. As a consequence, reverse 
causation does not drive the results. 
 
4. Results : evidence of a funding-liquidity risk premium 
 
Table 3 below displays the results of the first specification wherein we assess the impact 
of borrowers’ and lenders’ liquidity positions on e-MID overnight interest rates, controlling 
for day and borrower fixed effects, relationship lending, market fragmentation and bid/ask 
transaction shares. The sign and statistical significance of the NILPi,n-1 variable confirms our 
expectation that large net borrowers are penalized when asking for liquidity compared to 
those that are less money market-dependent. This effect is significant before the crisis, 
becomes stronger after the onset of the crisis and disappears with the beginning of the FRFA 
policy. We can use the descriptive statistics from Table A2 to quantify its importance. The 
coefficient of NILPi,n-1 indicates that, if the net borrowing ratio of a bank increases of one 
standard deviation (3,41) in the MRO week n-1, then its borrowing rates of MRO week n will 
on average grow of (3,41*0,059=) 0,20 bps before crisis, of 1,14 bps (=3,41*0,333) within 
crisis pre-Lehman and of 1.19 bps (=3,41*0,349) post-Lehman. The effect is small, but 
comparable to the magnitudes of other coefficients capturing the cross-sectional differences in 
O/N interest rates. This confirms the existence of an individual funding liquidity risk: a bank 
that has experienced a reduction of its liquidity position in the previous MRO week will pay a 
liquidity premium in the subsequent MRO weeks either because it has been effectively 
squeezed by liquidity-long banks (Nyborg and Strebulaeev, 2004) or because it has feared the 
stigma of borrowing at the marginal facility (Borio and Nelson, 2008, Drehmann and 
Nikolaou, 2013). 
Interestingly, the other side of funding liquidity risk, hoarding by liquidity-long banks, 
is also evidenced by these regressions. Indeed, the negative and significant coefficient of 
NILPj,n-1 means that lender j with excess liquidity to lend in the MRO week n-1 will charge 
on average higher rates when lending the next MRO week. Liquidity-long banks seem to 
squeeze liquidity-short ones and force them to pay a premium related to their market power. 
This “squeezing” premium is small before the crisis but becomes more substantial in the 
sequel. The augmentation of the premium imposed by liquidity-long lenders during the crisis 
suggests that short-squeezing was not the only rationale for hoarding: a precautionary motive 
due to the rise of liquidity uncertainty might also be at play. 
  
 
 
 
Table3: Basic Specification  
VARIABLES (1)Pre-Crisis (2)TurmoilPreLehman (3)TurmoilWithLehman (4)FRFA MRO 
BPI36
 
0.003 0.007 0.010 -0.031 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.033) 
LPI36 0.009** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.054*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) 
NILPi,n-1 0.059*** 0.333*** 0.349*** 0.099 
 (0.020) (0.091) (0.101) (0.097) 
NILPj,n-1 -0.018** -0.096*** -0.082*** -0.081 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.024) (0.103) 
BidWeighti,j,t(n) -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.059*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intrai,j -0.295*** -0.441** -0.527*** -0.786 
 (0.087) (0.201) (0.192) (1.199) 
Constant 235.231*** 426.880*** 427.370*** 407.084*** 
 (0.174) (2.209) (2.202) (6.447) 
N of Clusters (Borrowers) 
Borrower/Day/Lender FEs 
154 
Yes/Yes/No  
146 
Yes/Yes/No 
147  
Yes/Yes/No 
109  
Yes/Yes/No 
Observations 140,418 85,671 90,808 28,168 
R-squared 0.994 0.828 0.806 0.993 
(1) Regression using pre-crisis subsample: 02.01.2006 to 08.08.2007.  
(2) Regression using turmoil subsample before Lehman’s collapse (not included): 09.08.2007 to 14.09.2008.  
(3) Regression using turmoil subsample included Lehman’s default, until the FRFA MRO announcement (not included):   
09.08.2007 to 07.10.2008.  
(4) Regression using FRFA MRO period subsample: 08.10.2008 (announcement of FRFA MRO) to 07.05.2009 (announcement of 
FRFA 1 year LTROs). 
Coefficients for Borrower and Date fixed effects are not reported. 
All standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at borrower level.  
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
* Idem, 10%. 
  
 
 
One can notice that these results show that the liquidity allocation process is efficient 
when liquidity positions are non-persistent: if a borrower in week n becomes a lender in n+1 
he offers a discount; if a lender in n becomes a borrower in n+1 he obtains a discount. This is 
indeed well known from the literature: when liquidity shocks are non-persistent, those that 
obtain unexpected and unneeded liquidity can reallocate it efficiently to those that suffer an 
unexpected liquidity drain. However, the signs of our NILP variables also imply that 
borrowers in week n that stay borrowers in week n+1 pay a premium and that lenders 
remaining lenders charge a premium. This means that the liquidity allocation process is not 
efficient for those banks that suffer persistent liquidity shocks. Yet we have already shown 
above in section 3.2.2 that liquidity positions are quite persistent on e-MID for most of the 
participating banks. A consequence of this is that front-loader banks holding excess liquidity 
balances long before the end of the Reserve Maintenance Periods use their market power to 
obtain higher returns in the e-Mid market from those that are back-loaders. This is not 
efficient because persistently liquidity-long banks should be more eager to lend and thus offer 
discounts rather than require premiums.  
 
 
The significance of control variables in Table 3 suggests that funding liquidity risk is 
not the sole market imperfection creating heterogeneity in individual overnight rates, even if a 
simple comparison of the coefficients also reveals that, during the crisis, the liquidity 
positions of borrowers measured by NILPi,n-1 create more heterogeneity than any of the 
control variables.  
First, there is evidence of a market segmentation effect. This problem has been 
theoretically modeled by Freixas and Holthausen (2004) and empirically evidenced on similar 
e-MID data by Cassola et al. (2010). They argue that during crises interbank rates tend to be 
higher for cross-border trades because of increasing informational asymmetries. We confirm 
that inter-national money market transactions are punished by higher rates compared to 
domestic ones both before and during the crisis. A cross-border transaction costs on average  
0,295 bps more before the crisis and a 0,527 bps more in the crisis period including Lehman’s 
bankruptcy. This premium augmentation confirms the idea of increased informational 
asymmetries and market segmentation. This premium supported by the European emerging 
sovereign debt crisis might vary according to counterparty’s exact country. Lending to an 
Irish or to a German bank when you are a French bank should not imply the same risk within 
this troubled phase. Remember that 53% of our inter-national transactions include at least one 
Italian counterparty.  
Secondly, we also find evidence of a significant order side effect. We control for 
possible ‘bid-ask’ bounce effects by the variable 2ℎ*    described in section 3. We 
observe that the average rate paid by borrower i to lender j on day t slightly (but significantly) 
decreases when the share of transactions initiated by the borrower increases. We can relate 
this result to microstructure effects (Angelini et al. 2009) or to credit quality differences 
between counterparties who borrow on the buy and sell sides of the market (Schwarz 2009). 
Schwarz argues that banks preferring to hit a ‘sell’ order rather than submit a ‘buy’ order, are 
those that would hardly find counterparties if they first reveal their identities. At first sight 
this argument may seem questionable knowing that all hits on e-MID could be easily denied, 
as the side who posted the proposal discovers the aggressor’s identity before accepting the 
deal. However, what Schwarz (2009) meant in her paper was concerned probably the time of 
finding a counterparty. This is an overnight market and banks ask for immediate funding. 
Whereas for a ‘good’ counterparty, finding quick funding is not a problem, it just has to ask 
(send a ‘buy’ order), this may not be true for a ‘bad’ borrower whose ‘buy’ order might wait a 
  
 
lot before being hit. Thus, ‘bad’ banks needing quick, overnight refinancing will trade more 
often on the ‘sell order’ (‘ask’) side of the e-MID market. Our results are in line with this 
reasoning. In all our specifications, we find that lender j will charge lower rates to i if the 
trade concluded principally on the ‘buy order’ side of the market. The coefficient of the 
2ℎ* variable is negative and significant at the 1% level in all specifications, both 
before and within the crisis. Gabrieli (2012) uses the same variable to capture the reputation 
of the borrower and find very similar results.  
Thirdly, we also control for a possible liquidity network effect. Liquidity networks or 
customer interbank relationships are supposed to mitigate uncertainties within crisis. The 
coefficient of the first relationship variables 	36  (Borrower preference index) is very 
small, positive, but not significant. Our results concerning this variable are comparable to 
those found by Brauning and Fecht (2012) who test the impact of borrowing and lending 
preference indexes on German i-b rates. We cannot evidence that borrowing regularly from 
the same lender allows negotiating better rates or being more monitored. Concerning 

	36  that indicates to what extend lender j’s i-b assets are concentrated on borrower i, we 
find very similar results to Cocco et al. (2009) and Brauning and Fecht (2012). The 
coefficient of LPI is positive and significant at the 5% level before and at 1% within the 
crisis: the more a borrower is important and known to the lender the higher is the interest rate 
charged by the lender. Note that the significance and the amplitude of the 
	36  increase in 
turmoil times (columns 2 and 3) compared to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, it becomes even 
more important in times of fixed rate unlimited MROs. These results make us think that the 
LPI is a measure of concentration of a lender’s i-b assets on a single counterparty and must 
consequently be interpreted as a proxy for undiversified credit risk rather than as a measure of 
relationship lending. The other interpretation is that lenders prefer diversified credit risks to 
private information about their counterparties, especially in times of crisis. 
 
5. Robustness checks. 
5.1. Varying the liquidity measures 
We first check whether the results regarding the influence of Net Individual Liquidity 
Positions are due to the choice of one week windows to implement the netting of borrowing 
and lending positions. For that purpose, we provide in Table A1 in the appendix regressions 
wherein the variables NILPi,n-1 and NILPj,n-1 have been computed across full RMP periods 
rather than across MRO weeks. This is a first way to assess whether our results are 
determined by front-loading and back-loading strategies. Indeed, these strategies may produce 
unbalanced liquidity positions because, on the one side, front-loaders borrow and do not lend 
in the first MRO weeks of the RMP, in order to fulfill the average reserve requirement in 
advance, and then lend and no longer borrow in the last weeks of the RMP. Back-loader 
banks do the reverse. With NILPs computed over full lagged Reserve Maintenance Periods, 
the between-banks liquidity imbalances generated by such strategies are smoothed. Table A1 
shows that these new NILPlaggedRMP variables are no longer significant before the onset of the 
crisis, although they keep the same signs and levels. In the two crisis sub-periods however, 
the results are not modified: even if we compute Net Interbank Liquidity Positions over full 
RMP periods, which contain on average four MRO weeks, we still obtain that, during the 
crisis, net borrowers pay a significant premium when they borrow and net lenders charge a 
premium when they lend. 
We also check robustness of this liquidity risk effect using a volatility-based measure of 
liquidity risk. We compute the intra RMP standard deviations of daily liquidity shocks (net 
positions) for both borrowers and lenders. The results, displayed and commented in Appendix 
  
 
A2, confirm the interpretation that a funding liquidity risk premium was present on e-MID 
during our observation period. 
5.2. The individual liquidity position effect for dealer banks 
As discussed in section 3, the pricing conditions of intermediary banks could differ and 
liquidity risk might not affect them the same way. To check this, Table 4 displays a 
specification wherein the liquidity position variables are crossed with the dummies Dealerborr 
and Dealerlend. 
First, the significant positive coefficient of the crossed variable 	
,.4 × 6) !"" 
in the crisis sub-periods indicates that dealer borrowers paid a liquidity premium that was 
twice the one paid by non-dealer banks (columns 2 and 3 in Table 4). Lending to an 
Table 4: Specification with liquidity position-dealer bank interaction terms 
VARIABLES (1)PreCrisis (2)Turmoil 
PreLehman 
(3)Turmoil 
WithLehman 
(4)FRFA 
MRO era 
BPI36
 
0.003 0.004 0.007 -0.032 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) 
LPI36
 
0.009** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
NILPi,n-1 0.067** 0.215** 0.212** 0.056 
 (0.027) (0.084) (0.091) (0.119) 
NILPi,n-1 ×Dealerborr -0.032 0.298** 0.359** 0.099 
 (0.046) (0.139) (0.160) (0.124) 
NILPj,n-1 -0.018** -0.099*** -0.084*** -0.040 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.025) (0.104) 
NILPj,n-1 ×Dealerlend 0.039** 0.199*** 0.203*** 0.279*** 
 (0.015) (0.044) (0.042) (0.051) 
BidWeighti,j,t(n) -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.058*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intrai,j -0.303*** -0.464** -0.548*** -0.768 
 (0.086) (0.203) (0.192) (1.165) 
Constant 235.221*** 427.068*** 427.599*** 407.095*** 
 (0.175) (2.176) (2.165) (6.468) 
N of Clusters (Borrowers) 
Borrower/Day/Lender FEs 
154 
Yes/Yes/No  
146 
Yes/Yes/No 
147  
Yes/Yes/No 
109  
Yes/Yes/No 
Observations 140,418 85,671 90,808 28,168 
R-squared 0.994 0.829 0.807 0.993 
p-values 
H0: NILPi,n-1+NILPi,n-1×Dealerborr=0(a) 0.300 8.52e-06 3.30e-05 0.0148 
H0: NILPj,n-1+NILPj,n-1×Dealerlend =0(b) 0.223 0.0491 0.0165 0.0492 
(1) Regression using pre-crisis subsample: 02.01.2006 to 08.08.2007 included. 
(2) Regression using turmoil subsample before Lehman: 09.08.2007 to 14.09.2008. 
(3) Regression using turmoil subsample included Lehman, until the FRFA MRO announcement:   09.08.2007 to 07.10.2008.  
(4) Regression using FRFA MRO period subsample: 08.10.2008 (announcement of FRFA MRO) to 07.05.2009 
(announcement of FRFA 1 year LTROs). 
Coefficients for Borrower and Date fixed effects are not reported. 
All standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at borrower level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
* Idem, 10%. 
(a)  p-values of the F-test for the hypothesis that the sum of coefficients of  NILPi,n-1 and NILPi,n-1×Dealerborr is 0. 
(b) Idem for coefficients of  NILPj,n-1 and NILPj,n-1×Dealerlend. 
 
  
 
intermediary bank means lending indirectly to a range of unknown counterparties. This may 
explain why dealer banks could be considered riskier in periods of high uncertainty.  
Regarding the lender’s liquidity position variable, we find that the hoarding behavior 
evidenced in the previous specification displayed in Table 3 characterizes only the non-dealer 
lenders. Non-dealers that are liquidity-long charge a rate premium but we see in Table 4 that 
	
,.4 × 6)#$%   has a positive and significant sign showing that dealer banks offer a 
significant discount when they are liquidity-long. This is true before and during the crisis. 
Only non-dealer banks charged a premium when they were liquidity-long, which we consider 
the symptom of a hoarding behavior. Dealer-banks probably do not need to hoard liquidity 
because they have better access to standing facilities. 
 
 
5.3. The individual liquidity position effect and the bank size  
In all of the empirical studies cited in this paper, from Furfine (2001) to Brauning and 
Fecht (2012), bank size appears to be a critical variable for i-b rate formation. The common 
result is that very large banks enjoy privileged i-b rates compared to small ones. Fecht and al. 
(2011) show that distributional imbalances and own liquidity shortage affect more heavily 
small banks than large ones. To assess whether banks of various sizes are more or less 
affected by own liquidity position variations we run a new specification with crossed 
variables 	
 × (7 !""(#$%). Given that we are particularly interested in the relative 
differences between the small and the larger banks, we chose small banks as the reference 
category. Note that because we computed the bank size dummies using pre-crisis turnovers 
(see section 3.2.2.), incorporating these size variables in the regressions forces to omit any 
new bank entering the e-MID market after August 9, 2007. A few banks are therefore omitted 
in these regressions (see Table 5). As discussed in Angelini et al. (2009), who observe 
individual credit qualities of banks, there is no obvious evidence of quality deterioration of 
the e-MID panel due to this panel variation. Moreover, the small spreads between e-MID, 
EONIA and OTC market rates observed within the crisis proves that those sample movements 
do not really marginalize the post-crisis e-MID panel (see Arciero 2010). In any case, we 
check the impact of sample movements on our results in the robustness test presented below 
on the so-called “balanced panel”. 
The results of the specification with size dummies are reported in Table 5. The cost for 
being liquidity-short differs across bank size. From regression results in column 1, we see that 
the small banks paid the largest liquidity shortage premium before the crisis. More precisely, 
they paid 2.4 bps more when their net borrowing shares of the previous MRO week increased 
by 1%. Considering that our  	
,.4 variable reflects the individual reserve position of the 
borrowing bank, we could say that our pre crisis results validate the arguments of Fecht and 
al. (2011) concerning higher risks of being ‘squeezed’ for small banks. However, this 
interpretation should be done with caution in our case because a 1% increase in net borrowing 
share is more important for small than for major, medium and large banks. Net borrowing 
shares are naturally highly correlated with banks’ sizes. Table C below reports NILP statistics 
for borrower and lender banks of different sizes. We can see that, for small banks, the inter-
quartile range of the 	
  !""  variable is 0.34%. For major and large banks, this value is, 
respectively, 5.13% and 2.34%. Similar comments can be made regarding lenders’ liquidity 
positions (NILPj,n-1).  
 
  
 
 
Moreover, the results from the t-tests displayed at the bottom of Table 5 indicate that 
only major banks never pay a significant liquidity premium, even during the crisis. On the 
contrary, large and medium banks pay a significant liquidity premium both before and during 
the crisis. It is lower than the one paid by small banks before the crisis but, interestingly, it 
becomes larger during the crisis and much larger after Lehman’s collapse: the liquidity risk is 
considered more serious for larger banks after the onset of the crisis. 
Table 5: Specification with liquidity position-bank size interaction terms 
VARIABLES (1)PreCrisis 
(2)Turmoil 
PreLehman 
(3)Turmoil 
WithLehman 
(4)FRFA_MRO 
     
BPI36
 
0.004* 0.009 0.014 -0.028 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.033) 
LPI36
 
0.008* 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
NILPi,n-1 2.408*** 0.132 -0.204 0.361** 
 (0.658) (0.091) (0.161) (0.156) 
NILPi,n-1× Majorborr -2.391*** 0.182 0.537* -0.395 
 (0.658) (0.244) (0.289) (0.267) 
NILPi,n-1× Bigborr -2.287*** 0.250 0.600*** -0.065 
 (0.662) (0.175) (0.196) (0.226) 
NILPi,n-1× Mediumborr -2.078*** 0.186 0.552*** -0.342** 
 (0.658) (0.116) (0.172) (0.170) 
NILPj,n-1 0.650** -0.395*** -0.365*** 1.034*** 
 (0.327) (0.083) (0.085) (0.198) 
NILPj,n-1×  Majorlend -0.666** 0.287*** 0.258*** -1.248*** 
 (0.326) (0.083) (0.084) (0.257) 
NILPj,n-1× Biglend -0.666** 0.345*** 0.321*** -1.136*** 
 (0.328) (0.079) (0.084) (0.208) 
NILPj,n-1×
 
Mediumlend -0.776** 0.291*** 0.334*** -0.687*** 
 (0.335) (0.077) (0.082) (0.199) 
BidWeighti,j,t(n) -0.009*** -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.058*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intrai,j -0.296*** -0.435** -0.518*** -0.611 
 (0.087) (0.200) (0.190) (1.193) 
Constant 234.419*** 426.869*** 427.303*** 407.060*** 
 (0.270) (2.213) (2.205) (6.227) 
N of Clusters (Borrowers) 
Borrower/Day/Lender FEs 
154 
Yes/Yes/No 
140 
Yes/Yes/No 
141 
Yes/Yes/No 
103 
Yes/Yes/No 
Observations 140,418 84,521 89,487 26,812 
R-squared 0.994 0.828 0.807 0.993 
p-values 
H0:NILPi,n-1+NILPi,n-1×Majorborr=0(a) 0.255 0.167 0.187 0.875 
H0 :NILPi,n-1+ NILPi,n-1×
 
Bigborr=0(b) 0.0322 0.00994 0.0144 0.0772 
H0 :NILPi,n-1+NILPi,n-1×Medborr=0(c) 0 2.71e-06 3.22e-05 0.874 
H0 :NILPj,n-1+NILPj,n-1×Majorlend=0(a’) 0.0483 4.57e-06 2.70e-05 0.121 
H0 :NILPj,n-1+NILPj,n-1×Biglend=0(b’) 0.223 0.0845 0.161 0.303 
H0 :NILPj,n-1+NILPj,n-1×Medlend=0(c’) 4.44e-05 0.0359 0.502 0.000196 
(1) Regression using pre-crisis subsample: 02.01.2006 to 08.08.2007 ; (2) Regression using turmoil subsample before Lehman: 09.08.2007 to 
14.09.2008; (3) Regression using turmoil subsample included Lehman, until the FRFA MRO announcement:   09.08.2007 to 07.10.2008 ; (4) 
Regression using FRFA MRO period subsample: 08.10.2008 (announcement of FRFA MRO) to 07.05.2009 (announcement of FRFA 1 year 
LTROs). 
Coefficients for Borrower and Date fixed effects are not reported. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered at borrower level. 
*** Statistical significance at 1% level; ** Idem, 5%; * Idem, 10%. 
(a), (b), (c) p-values of F-statistics testing the hypothesis that coefficient  NILPi,n-1+NILPi,n-1×Sizeborr=0. 
(a’), (b’), (c’) idem for  NILPj,n-1+NILPj,n-1×Sizelend=0. 
  
 
 
Table C: Detailed Statistics of NILP for lenders and borrowers by size  
Variables Size  mean sd min max p25 p50 p75 p90 iqr N 
N
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Majorborr 3.66 4.41 -
31.30 
35.57 1.12 3.73 6.25 8.25 5.13 38459 
Bigborr 2.57 2.66 -
13.36 
31.05 1.22 2.36 3.56 5.21 2.34 67257 
Mediumborr 1.39 2.34 -7.11 19.98 0.19 0.65 1.79 3.79 1.60 137628 
Smallborr 0.55 1.49 -5.45 16.04 0.05 0.16 0.38 1.33 0.34 19637 
Totalborr 1.96 2.92 -
31.30 
35.57 0.24 1.11 3.02 5.34 2.78 262981 
N
I
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P
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b
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e
 
 Majorlend -3.05 4.20 -
31.30 
28.25 -5.21 -2.97 -1.00 1.59 4.21 31050 
Biglend -2.10 2.81 -
19.71 
27.43 -3.28 -1.74 -0.58 0.65 2.70 38629 
Mediumlend -0.70 0.95 -
11.74 
19.98 -1.09 -0.55 -0.22 0.03 0.87 148704 
Smalllend -0.29 0.75 -7.14 16.04 -0.44 -0.19 -0.07 -0.01 0.36 42177 
Totallend  -1.12 2.16 -
31.30 
28.25 -1.47 -0.60 -0.18 0.09 1.30 260560 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The influence of lenders’ liquidity position is also affected by their size in a way that 
changes during the crisis. Recall that a negative sign of NILPj,n-1 is interpreted as evidence 
of a hoarding
 
behavior because it means that liquidity-long banks charge a premium when 
they lend money to liquidity-short ones. The t-tests at the bottom of Table 5 show that only 
major and medium banks have a significant negative sign of NILPj,n-1
 
before the crisis. In 
that period, small banks do not hoard. On the contrary, banks of any size hoard in the turmoil 
period before Lehman’s collapse, but larger banks hoard less than the small ones because they 
charge a much smaller premium when they are liquidity-long in the previous MRO week. 
Only the small and the major ones keep a significant hoarding premium after Lehman’s 
collapse. Overall, larger banks hoard both before and during the crisis, but they may do so for 
different motives: short-squeezing before the crisis and precautionary hoarding during the 
crisis. Small banks do not hoard before the crisis and only charge a positive premium when 
they are liquidity-short. 
5.4. The individual liquidity position effect and the distance from the end-of-RMP 
Within the official reserve maintenance period, European banks have to fulfill reserve 
requirements based on their previous month balance sheets. Thus, each bank knows in 
advance the average level of reserves that it should keep at the end of each day to smoothly 
satisfy reserve requirements. However, banks have the possibility to deviate from their daily 
required reserve targets as what matters is the average of their end of day reserves throughout 
the entire RMP. They may keep more than the daily required target on their reserve accounts 
at the beginning of the RMP and less at the end (front-loading), or inversely they may balance 
their beginning-of-RMP reserve shortage only at the end of the RMP (back-loading).  
In normal times, when the i-b market is theoretically frictionless and the usage of 
standing facilities is not perceived as a bad signal, bank’s choice of belonging to the back- or 
front- loading group depends mainly on the path of its individual liquidity shocks which in its 
turn is related to bank’s specific activity, size etc. Thus, when the back- and front- loading 
groups are “liquidity shock” driven the overall liquidity needs tend to remain close to the 
‘benchmark’17 (just sufficient) level, as it is hard to imagine the whole system simultaneously 
receiving positive and negative shocks (see Kempa 2008). However during the crisis when the 
interbank market frictions increased and the recourse to the borrowing facility became 
stigmatizing, European banks’ massively preferred to satisfy reserve requirement early in the 
RMP as back loading turned to be too costly. Under the neutral monetary policy 
implementation this “preference” driven reserve fulfillment menaced interbank rates to 
deviate considerably from the target rate and thus made the ECB providing more than the 
‘benchmark’ at the beginning of the RMP and reabsorb it farther by the end of the period.  
We recall that our NILP variable is computed for one MRO week whatever the distance 
of this later from the end-of-the RMP. Thus, in the Table 6 below we provide results from an 
additional specification which permits us to compare the sensibility of interbank rates to 
individual liquidity positions of the beginning to the ones of the end of the RMP. We use two 
crossed variables NILPi,n-1×EndofRMP and NILPj,n-1×EndofRMP to capture the difference 
in the impact of the end-of-RMP positions. The variable EndofRMP is a dummy that is equal 
to 1 if the given (n-1)th MRO week is the last or the before last week of the RMP18.  
The positive and significant coefficient of NILPi,n-1×EndofRMP in Table 6 column 1 
shows that before the crisis the liquidity shortage premium for borrowers was approximately 
three times more important at the end of the RMP  (back- loading)  (0.041+0,079) than at the 
                                                 
17
 Benchmark allotment was the expression to design the liquidity amount computed as the sum of the expected 
changes in autonomous factors and banks’ remaining reserve requirements.  
18
 Depending on the length of the RMP, the number of MRO weeks per RMP varies from 3 to 6 (most often 4-5) 
  
 
beginning of the RMP (front-loading). This seems quite natural as the probability of using 
standing facilities increase if the bank waits the end of the RMP to average reserves. 
However, we observe that during the crisis (see Table 6, column 2 and 3) the difference 
between the impacts of borrowers’ end-of-RMP and beginning-of-RMP positions on rates is 
smaller compared to the pre-crisis phase (Table 6, column 2 and 3). We explain this fact by 
the massive front-loading preferences that characterized banks in the Eurosystem at that 
period. The number of banks waiting to adjust reserves at the end of the RMP being 
considerably smaller made the end-of-RMP borrower’s interbank position at least as 
important as the beginning-of-RMP one.  
 
Table 6 : Specification with liquidity position and EndofRMP interaction terms 
VARIABLES (1) PreCrisis (2) Turmoil 
PreLehman 
(3) Turmoil 
WithLehman 
(4)FRFA_MRO 
     
BPI 0.003 0.007 0.010 -0.031 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.033) 
LPI 0.009** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.054*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
NILPi,n-1
 
0.041** 0.284*** 0.334*** 0.144 
 (0.016) (0.082) (0.096) (0.107) 
NILPi,n-1×EndofRMP
 
0.079* 0.134 0.040 -0.168** 
 (0.041) (0.121) (0.132) (0.083) 
NILPj,n-1
 
-0.011 -0.020 -0.022 -0.077 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.020) (0.113) 
NILPj,n-1×EndofRMP -0.032 -0.338*** -0.258*** -0.024 
 (0.026) (0.069) (0.074) (0.115) 
BidWeighti,j,t(n) -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.059*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intrai,j -0.297*** -0.467** -0.543*** -0.739 
 (0.086) (0.203) (0.195) (1.185) 
Constant 235.311*** 427.000*** 427.448*** 407.132*** 
 (0.175) (2.211) (2.201) (6.455) 
N of Clusters (Borrowers) 
Borrower/Day/Lender FEs 
154 
Yes/Yes/No  
146 
Yes/Yes/No 
147  
Yes/Yes/No 
109  
Yes/Yes/No 
Observations 140,418 85,671 90,808 28,168 
R-squared 0.994 0.829 0.806 0.993 
H0:NILPi,n-1+NILPi,n-1× 
EndOfRMP=0(a) 
0.009 0.002 0.013 0.803 
H0 : NILPj,n-1+NILPi,n-1× 
EndOfRMP =0(b) 
0.084 8.48e-07 0.0002 0.314 
(1) Regression using pre-crisis subsample: 02.01.2006 to 08.08.2007 included 
(2) Regression using turmoil subsample before Lehman: 09.08.2007 to 14.09.2008 
(3) Regression using turmoil subsample included Lehman, until the FRFA MRO announcement:   09.08.2007 to 07.10.2008  
(4) Regression using FRFA MRO period subsample: 08.10.2008 (announcement of FRFA MRO) to 07.05.2009 
(announcement of FRFA 1 year LTROs). 
Coefficients for Borrower and Date fixed effects are not reported    
Standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at borrower level.  
*** Statistical significance at 1% level 
** Idem, 5% 
* Idem, 10% 
(a) p-values of F-statistics testing the hypothesis that coefficient  NILPi,n-1+ NILPi,n-1×EndOfRMP =0  
(b) idem for  NILPj,n-1+NILPi,n-1×EndOfRMP =0  
 
 
  
 
Regarding the impact of the liquidity position of lenders, the evolution of the level and 
significance of NILPj,n-1×endofRMP (Table 6 column 2 and 3) during the crisis reveals that 
liquidity long banks were especially reluctant to lend in the last weeks of the RMP. This end-
of-RMP specific liquidity hoarding during the crisis could explain the massive front-loading 
strategy failover and changes in the operational framework of the ECB regarding the 
allocation of liquidity throughout the RMP.  
5.5. Addressing outliers and selection issues 
Some banks trade more infrequently than others and may create artificial interest rate 
heterogeneity. Moreover, a selection bias may be generated by the fact that some banks leave 
e-MID after the onset of the crisis whereas some others enter the market on the contrary. 
Table 7 below displays the results of regressions implemented on a sample of banks that trade 
on e-MID in every sub-period and frequently enough. More precisely, we excluded those that 
entered or leaved the market during one of the four sub-periods as well as those that traded in 
less than 10% of the operational days. Although the sample loses between 16 and 57 banks 
depending on the sub-period, the results are not changed. In particular, the impact of lenders’ 
and borrowers’ liquidity positions displays the same features as in the full sample regressions.
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 7: Robustness check§ of the basic specification (Table 3) 
VARIABLES (1)PreCrisis (2)TurmoilPreLehman (3)TurmoilWithLehman (4)FRFA_MRO 
BPI36
 
0.009*** 0.006 0.007 -0.041 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.034) 
LPI36
 
0.015* 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.050*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
NILPi,n-1
 
0.111*** 0.367*** 0.387*** 0.095 
 (0.042) (0.097) (0.106) (0.104) 
NILPj,n-1
 
-0.036*** -0.089*** -0.084*** -0.120 
 (0.014) (0.027) (0.029) (0.111) 
BidWeighti,j,t(n) -0.010*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.054*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intrai,j -0.318** -0.371 -0.524* -0.626 
 (0.127) (0.290) (0.288) (1.262) 
Constant 235.098*** 431.557*** 431.583*** 426.742*** 
 (0.236) (2.395) (2.405) (5.886) 
N of Clusters (Borrowers) 
Borrower/Day/Lender 
FEs 
97 
Yes/Yes/No  
100 
Yes/Yes/No 
100  
Yes/Yes/No 
93  
Yes/Yes/No 
Observations 82,539 74,012 78,558 24,846 
R-squared 0.994 0.833 0.810 0.993 
§ Both Buyers’ and Sellers’ panel is balanced within all 4 periods. Simultaneously, we have restricted both panels to active participants only, i.e. we 
dropped buyers and sellers who had traded within less than the 10th percentile of operational days in each subsample.  
(5) Regression using pre-crisis subsample: 02.01.2006 to 08.08.2007 included. 
(6) Regression using turmoil subsample before Lehman: 09.08.2007 to 14.09.2008. 
(7) Regression using turmoil subsample included Lehman, until the FRFA MRO announcement:   09.08.2007 to 07.10.2008.  
(8) Regression using FRFA MRO period subsample: 08.10.2008 (announcement of FRFA MRO) to 07.05.2009 (announcement of FRFA 1 year LTROs). 
Coefficients for Borrower and Date fixed effects are not reported. 
Standard errors reported in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at borrower level.  
*** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
** Idem, 5%. 
* Idem, 10%. 
  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
We studied at an individual level the price that banks pay for liquidity, as measured by 
overnight interest rates on the e-MID transparent trading platform. Using data from both 
before and within turmoil periods, we provided evidence that a borrower’s and lender’s 
liquidity positions influence this price both before and during the turmoil: borrowers that are 
liquidity-short in the week before they borrow pay a positive premium, and lenders that are 
liquidity-long in the week before they lend charge a positive premium. We interpret the 
former finding as evidence of a funding liquidity risk premium and the latter as evidence of 
liquidity hoarding. The liquidity premium disappears after the ECB has launched its full 
allotment policy in October 2008. This effect is robust to measure and sample variations.  
We also assessed whether these liquidity effects were specific to particular types of 
banks or due to the period of reserve maintenance periods in the Euro system. We found that 
dealer banks paid a liquidity premium that was twice that paid by non-dealer banks in the 
crisis sub-periods and that only non-dealer banks charged a premium when they were 
liquidity-long. Regarding heterogeneity of this liquidity effect across sizes, we found that 
small banks paid the largest liquidity shortage premium before the crisis and that only major 
banks never paid a significant liquidity premium even during the crisis. On the contrary, large 
and medium banks paid a significant liquidity premium both before and during the crisis. This 
premium is lower than the one paid by small banks before the crisis but, interestingly, it 
becomes larger during the crisis and much larger after Lehman’s collapse. Only major and 
medium banks have a significant negative sign of the liquidity position variable before the 
crisis meaning that, in that period, small banks do not hoard. On the contrary, banks of any 
size hoard in the turmoil period before Lehman’s collapse, but larger banks hoard less than 
the small ones because they charge a much smaller premium when they are liquidity-long in 
the previous MRO week. Only the small and major banks keep a significant hoarding 
premium after Lehman’s collapse. Finally, we found an end-of-RMP supplementary premium 
for liquidity-short banks before the crisis but it is no longer significant during the crisis. The 
increasing premium charged by liquidity-long banks during the crisis is significant and strong 
only in the last weeks of the RMP. These findings are in line with the changes in the reserve 
fulfillment preferences of banks throughout the RMP during the crisis.  
 As far as we know, these results are new to the literature on the individual rates paid 
by banks for liquidity because most previous cross-sectional studies on the funding liquidity 
risk focused on the primary money market and therefore examined banks behavior during the 
auctions organized by central banks for their main refinancing operations. Only one other 
cross-sectional study on the secondary Sterling money market by Acharya and 
Merrouche (2013) provides evidence of a funding liquidity risk because they find that 
individual unsecured overnight spreads vary significantly with the liquidity held by other 
banks (but not with the own bank liquidity endowment). We obtain different results for the 
Euro system because both the own liquidity position of borrowers and the liquidity situation 
of lenders appear to influence significantly the individual overnight rates in our estimations.  
The political implications of such funding liquidity risk premiums are still to be 
analyzed, but we think that these problems could have worsened substantially if central banks 
had not decided to allot unlimited amounts of liquidity at fixed rates. Therefore, the existence 
of a funding liquidity risk premium is at least a reminder that interbank markets do not always 
allocate liquidity with efficiency and sometimes need to be supported by the lender as a last 
resort. 
  
 
 
APPENDIX A1: computing the net lending positions over full lagged Reserve 
Maintenance Periods. 
 
Table A1: Regressions with Net Lending Positions computed over full lagged Reserve Maintenance Periods 
VARIABLES PreCrisis Turmoil 
PreLehman 
Turmoil 
WithLehman 
FRFA_MRO 
     
BPI36 0.004* 0.006 0.008 -0.026 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.030) 
LPI36 0.008** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) 
NILPi,laggedRMP 0.099 0.444** 0.532*** -0.006 
 (0.063) (0.195) (0.162) (0.262) 
NILPj,laggedRMP -0.012 -0.088*** -0.090*** 0.030 
 (0.008) (0.030) (0.032) (0.118) 
BidWeighti,j,t(n) -0.010*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.059*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intrai,j -0.314*** -0.368* -0.447** -1.903 
 (0.088) (0.222) (0.211) (1.173) 
Constant 234.579** 426.424*** 426.655*** 428.497*** 
 (0.171) (2.265) (2.257) (5.903) 
Day/Borr Fixed 
effects  
Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
Observations 138,485 86,875 92,055 28,991 
R-squared 0.994 0.825 0.803 0.993 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Appendix A2 
Test of an alternative measure of funding liquidity risk 
In the theoretical literature, some authors make a clear distinction between within day 
(early) and end-of-day (late) liquidity shocks (Välimäki (2003), Pérez-Quirós and Rodríguez-
Mendizábal (2006), Kempa (2006)). In their models, only late unexpected liquidity 
movements occurring after the interbank market closure generate the necessity to use standing 
facilities. Interbank trading is supposed to be the most natural means of offsetting early 
shocks. This assumption implies that the higher is the volatility of unexpected end-of-day 
shocks the higher is the probability of resorting to standing facilities, which is considered 
being a liquidity risk because interbank markets are supposed to be less costly. However, it is 
quite difficult to identify empirically late reserve adjustments because one needs to get 
information not only on reserve movements themselves, but also on reserve fulfillment and 
recourse to standing facilities at individual bank level. Cocco and al. (2009) managed to 
isolate the reserve movements that are not related to i-b trades and used the standard deviation 
of the latter as an indicator of liquidity risk. Even if the variable appeared being non-
significant for liquidity pricing they showed that it was still important for the emergence of 
substantial liquidity relationships. Brauning and Fecht (2013) used the standard deviation of 
daily reserve changes over bank’s reserve requirement for the same purpose, without 
differentiating end-of-day shocks from within-day shocks. This volatility based liquidity risk 
variable appears to be significant for i-b liquidity pricing. Note that within  the crisis period 
  
 
when i-b market’s frictions emerged, standing facilities were no longer exclusively used for 
offsetting end-of-day shocks. Moreover, the reserve adjustment either by i-b markets or by 
standing facilities became penalizing and the volatility of daily reserve changes started 
generating higher funding costs.  
We thus test another proxy to capture bank’s liquidity risk. Our e-MID dataset does not 
provide us any information on bank’s daily reserve movements but we can proxy these shocks 
by the daily net lending positions (lendings−borrowings) of our banks on e-MID. If bank’s net 
daily lending position is positive then we consider that it has received a positive schock; if it 
is negative then the shock is supposed to be negative. For each bank we compute the standard 
deviation of their daily liquidity shocks within one RMP. We call this variable 
LIQURisklaggedRMP and introduce the lagged value of this new liquidity measure in our 
regressions instead of the NILP variables originally used. The results are in the following 
Table. 
 
Table A2 : liquidity risk measured by the volatility of daily lending positions 
 PreCrisis Turmoil 
PreLehman 
Turmoil 
WithLehman 
FRFA_MRO 
VARIABLES     
     
BPI36 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.040 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.027) 
LPI36 0.011** 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.056*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) 
LIQURiski,laggedRMP 0.000 0.002 0.003* 0.022** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) 
LIQURiskj,laggedRMP 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Bidweighti,j,t(n) -0.010*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.058*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intrai,j -0.233** -0.050 -0.092 -0.535 
 (0.090) (0.209) (0.208) (1.290) 
Constant 234.430*** 425.302*** 425.278*** 418.503*** 
 (0.172) (2.393) (2.426) (5.789) 
     
Observations 136,217 85,943 90,997 28,411 
R-squared 0.994 0.826 0.804 0.993 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
If we compare these results to those using NILP variables in the basic specification (Table 3), 
we see that the slight changes do not modify the interpretation regarding the liquidity risk 
effect. Whereas NILP variables had a significant impact both before and within crisis, the 
volatility of borrowers’ liquidity position is significant only in the turmoil period including 
Lehman’s failure and in the FRFA period. In both sub-periods, borrowers paid a premium if 
this volatility was high. The volatility of lenders’ liquidity position is significant in all sub-
periods and we see that they required a premium for borrowing when their liquidity position 
volatility was high. The main difference regarding the impact of this volatility measure on 
liquidity pricing compared to the NILP variable appears in the fourth column of Table A2: the 
impact and significance of LIQURisklaggedRMP increases after the implementation of the 
FRFA primary allocation of liquidity. This fact casts some doubt on the effectiveness of 
the ECB’s interventions to mitigate liquidity risk.  
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